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Policy makers should consider allowing more free-
dom in Minnesota's banking industry. To assure 
consumers convenient and innovative banking ser-
vices and to let banks compete as other financial 
firms already can, policy makers should loosen re-
strictions on new types of banking facilities, branch 
banking, and holding company affiliations. To fur-
ther increase competition and possibly decrease the 
prices of bank services, they should also consider 
letting banks from other states locate in Minnesota. 
These recommendations are based on our study 
of competition in Minnesota's banking industry. It 
suggests that even though two large multibank 
holding companies (MBHCs) hold about half the 
state's bank deposits the industry is competitive, so 
current government restrictions may not be neces-
sary. 
In banking as in other industries, the public is 
usually best served when firms are free to compete 
without government intervention. As firms individu-
ally try to maximize their profits, the industry as a 
whole provides the goods and services consumers 
want at the least cost. When a few firms hold a large 
share of the market, however, an industry could 
easily not be competitive. Since they're so large, the 
firms may not need to compete; together they could 
set their own high prices and offer few services in 
order to increase their profits. 
The government has a role in any industry with 
the potential for this kind of noncompetitive behav-
ior, but how much it needs to do is hard to deter-
mine. Its role could range from just monitoring 
prices and the availability of goods and services to 
explicitly limiting the size and activities of the firms. 
Although economic theory provides little guidance 
here, obviously government involvement should be 
more restrictive if noncompetitive behavior is de-
tected and less if only the potential exists. 
The government has restricted Minnesota's 
banking industry quite a bit without evidence of such 
behavior. The potential clearly exists here—together 
First Bank System and Northwest Bancorporation 
hold about half of the state's bank deposits—so 
some government involvement is needed. Without 
evidence of noncompetitive behavior by these two 
firms, though, policy makers have been limiting 
their activities and in some ways the activities of all 
banks. The Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, for example, has been reluctant to 
let the two MBHCs acquire more banks. And the 
state of Minnesota has prohibited all banks from 
branching and severely limited the type and location 
of other facilities they may offer. (See box on page 
7.) 
This much government intervention may have 
been necessary if the industry was not competitive. 
But policy makers had no evidence of that before 
they restricted Minnesota's banks. Have affiliates of 
the two large MBHCs actually been earning a 
greater return than other banks by charging higher 
prices and offering fewer services? 
Let's look at the evidence. 
A Look at Profits
1 
Past studies of bank performance have looked at 
bank profits more than other measures because data 
Ipart of an as yet unpublished study of the profitability of Minnesota 
banks by David S. Dahl, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1977. 
1 which can be used to measure profitability are col-
lected regularly by federal agencies. Generally, 
"profitability" is the measure of a firm's return on 
capital. In banking studies it is usually measured by 
the ratio of net income to bank equity. Net income is 
total revenue less all operating expenses, security 
gains and losses, and taxes; bank equity is simply 
assets less liabilities. 
But some have argued against the net income to 
equity ratio as a good measure of profitability. One 
study, for example, showed that the federal tax on 
corporate income considerably alters the relation-
ship between the size and net income of commercial 
banks so income before taxes should be used.
2 
Others have questioned whether equity is as mean-
ingful in banking as in other industries and have 
suggested total assets as a more appropriate 
measure.
3 
Our purpose here is to compare the profitability 
of affiliates of Minnesota's two large MBHCs to that 
of other Minnesota banks, not evaluate the relative 
merits of profitability measures. To take these criti-
cisms into account, however, we examine four 
measures of profitability: net income to equity and 
income before taxes to equity, net income to total 
assets, and income before taxes to total assets. In 
order to test the consistency of our results, we make 
these comparisons for five consecutive years (1971 
through 1975).
4 
But simply comparing affiliates of the two large 
MBHCs to other banks may be misleading. Previous 
profitability studies suggest that size, location in 
rural or urban areas, and location in counties with or 
without affiliates may affect the profitability of a 
bank. So besides comparing all affiliates to all other 
banks, we make several other comparisons based on 
size and location. 
Our results are clear: on average, affiliates of 
the two large MBHCs have been more profitable 
than other banks.
5 
Table 1 shows our results for the net income to 
equity measure of profitability. (The results for the 
other measures are substantially the same; they are 
not reported but are available upon request.) On 
average, affiliates of the two large MBHCs have had 
much higher profit rates than all others.
6 Banks 
which do not compete locally with affiliates of the 
two have been slightly more profitable than nonaffil-
iate banks in affiliate counties, but they have still 
been considerably less profitable than affiliate 
banks. 
When classified by urban and rural location and 
then by size, affiliate banks have still been more 
profitable. This is true in urban areas both when the 
affiliates are compared to all other banks and when 
other banks are divided by counties with and with-
out affiliates. With some minor exceptions, the re-
sult holds regardless of size. 
The rural comparisons appear to have more 
significant exceptions. Although the results hold 
between all rural affiliates of the two large MBHCs 
and all other rural banks, large rural banks in coun-
ties without affiliates seem to have been much more 
profitable than any other banks in rural counties 
with affiliates—including the affiliates. Since the 
group of nonaffiliate large rural banks is very 
small, however, this does not seriously weaken the 
evidence that affiliates of the two large MBHCs 
have on average been more profitable than other 
banks in Minnesota.
7 
2Lyle E. Gramley, A Study of Scale Economies in Commercial Banking 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Missouri, 1962), p. 36. 
3 Administrator of National Banks, Studies in Banking Competition and 
the Banking Structure (Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 161. 
4The study included all insured commercial banks in Minnesota. Profit-
ability measures were calculated from semiannual Reports of Condition 
and annual Reports of Income filed with federal regulatory agencies. Total 
assets and equity for each year were calculated by averaging the amounts 
on the reports for December of the preceding year and June and December 
of the current year. 
5Some nonaffiliate banks have been more profitable than affiliate banks, 
but the average of all affiliates' profit rates is consistently higher than the 
average of other banks'. 
^The profitability of banks not affiliated with the two large MBHCs could 
be understated because to minimize taxes stockholder-officers of family 
controlled or closely held banks could be realizing bank profits as higher 
salaries instead of as dividends. This may help explain the difference we 
find between small affiliate and nonaffiliate banks because small nonaffili-
ates are those most likely to be family controlled. But that difference could 
also be explained by the greater benefits of affiliation for smaller banks. 
And this kind of profit-understatement cannot explain the difference be-
tween large banks. 
7TWO other studies have specifically compared the profitability of 
Minnesota's MBHCs to other banks. Both used the net income to equity 
measure, and both got the same results. Carter H. Golembe Associates, 
using data for just one year (1968), compared the profitability of affiliates 
of all MBHCs to that of all banks in Minnesota—in the aggregate and 
broken down by deposit size. Francis M. Boddy, using data for two years 
(1972 and 1975), compared banks by counties with and without affiliates as 
2  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Fall 1977 Table 1 
Profitability of Banks Affiliated with Minnesota's Two Largest MBHCs 
and All Other Minnesota Banks, 1971-75 
Average Net Income to Equity Ratios 





























1971  12.6%  9.2%  8.8%  9.9%  96  626  380  246 
1972  12.3  8.7  8.4  9.2  97  631  389  242 
1973  12.2  10.3  9.9  10.8  98  636  403  233 
1974  12.5  11.3  11.0  11.8  98  639  415  224 
1975  11.9  10.5  10.3  11.0  98  645  419  226 
All urban banks
1 
1971  11.8%  8.0%  7.7%  9.8%  45  124  106  18 
1972  11.9  7.7  7.4  9.6  45  127  109  18 
1973  10.9  9.2  9.2  9.0  46  130  121  9 
1974  10.1  9.5  9.5  —  46  133  133  0 
1975  10.2  8.8  8.8  —  46  137  137  0 
Small urban
2 
1971  11.6  7.5  7.1  9.9  11  110  94  16 
1972  11.4  7.4  7.0  9.4  10  112  96  16 
1973  10.4  9.0  9.1  8.6  12  113  105  8 
1974  9.4  9.5  9.5  —  11  116  116  0 
1975  9.4  8.5  8.5  —  10  115  115  0 
Large urban 
1971  11.9  11.6  12.0  8.9  34  14  12  2 
1972  12.0  9.9  9.7  11.4  35  15  13  2 
1973  11.0  9.9  9.8  11.8  34  17  16  1 
1974  10.3  9.0  9.0  .—  35  17  17  0 
1975  10.5  10.1  10.1  —  36  22  22  0 
All rural banks 
1971  13.3%  9.6%  9.3%  9.9%  51  502  274  228 
1972  12.7  9.0  8.8  9.2  52  504  280  224 
1973  13.3  10.5  10.3  10.9  52  506  282  224 
1974  14.7  11.7  11.7  11.8  52  506  282  224 
1975  13.3  11.0  11.0  11.0  52  508  282  226 
Small rural 
1971  13.4  9.5  9.2  9.9  40  496  268  228 
1972  12.7  9.0  8.8  9.2  40  497  273  224 
1973  13.5  10.5  10.2  10.9  33  494  272  222 
1974  15.5  11.8  11.8  11.8  31  490  268  222 
1975  13.9  11.0  11.0  10.9  29  482  261  221 
Large rural 
1971  13.1  10.6  10.6  —  11  6  6  0 
1972  12.8  8.6  8.6  —  12  7  7  0 
1973  12.9  11.5  10.6  16.3  19  12  10  2 
1974  13.5  11.2  10.7  14.6  21  16  14  2 
1975  12.5  11.8  11.5  13.4  23  26  21  5 
1 "Urban" banks are those in counties with standard metropolitan statistical areas: Anoka, Carver, Clay, Dakota, Hennepin, 
Olmsted, Ramsey, St. Louis, Scott, and Washington counties. All other banks are "rural." 
2 "Small" banks are those with deposits less than $25 million; all other banks are "large." 
Sources: Federal bank regulatory agencies 
3 The profit data alone therefore do seem to indi-
cate that Minnesota's banking industry has not been 
competitive. But before drawing this conclusion, we 
must look at the most direct measures of noncom-
petitive behavior—prices and services—where these 
profits are supposed to be coming from. 
The Best Evidence: Prices and Services
8 
Most past studies of bank performance have not in-
cluded bank prices (such as interest rates and ser-
vice charges) or the availability of services because 
good data have simply not existed. Governmental 
agencies have not been collecting them regularly, as 
they have data on profitability. To study prices, 
researchers had to construct rough measures from 
bank income statements and balance sheets.
9 These 
price estimates are questionable because they do not 
take into account factors like quality, maturity, and 
transaction costs which vary with the many different 
kinds of loans and deposits banks offer. Researchers 
have not even had rough measures of the availability 
of banking services. 
To look for reliable evidence that MBHC affili-
ates are charging higher prices and offering fewer 
services than other banks, we use prices and 
services reported directly by banks to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in a 1975 survey.
1
0 
These data are still somewhat limited in that they 
represent only one date and only a sample of rural 
banks
nand they do not include some important bank 
services such as business loans. But the data are the 
best ever available to evaluate this question. Be-
sides being explicit quotes from banks, they include 
many more prices than have ever been reported and 
service information never before examined. 
Using these data we first compare rural banks 
affiliated with Minnesota's two large MBHCs to 
other rural Minnesota banks. Table 2 shows the 
results of this comparison: on average, affiliates of 
Minnesota's two large MBHCs have not been 
charging higher prices or offering fewer services 
than other banks. Actually, affiliate banks have 
charged lower interest rates for some loans, offered 
higher rates on some deposits, and provided more 
services than other banks. When tested statistically, 
however, most of the differences between affiliates 
and other banks are so small they are not statistical-
ly significant. And of those that are significant, the 
higher prices or fewer services are evenly divided 
between the two groups of banks. 
If affiliates were not competing, though, this 
comparison may not reveal it. The average prices 
charged by other banks may be close to those of af-
filiates because they include prices of banks located 
in markets where affiliate banks are setting high 
prices for all banks in the market. We therefore also 
compare banks in counties with affiliates to those in 
counties without them. 
The results, shown in Table 3, are generally the 
same. On average, banks in affiliate counties have 
offered a mixture of lower and higher prices and 
more and fewer services than other banks. Again, 
most of the differences are small. This time only one 
is statistically significant, and it favors banks in af-
filiate counties. 
Still, if the market for banking services were 
really the state rather than the county, the two large 
well as by deposit size, and separated MBHC banks into affiliates of the 
two largest and others. The studies' results agreed: Golembe found affili-
ates of MBHCs clearly more profitable than all banks, and Boddy found af-
filiates of the two largest MBHCs the most profitable. See Carter H. 
Golembe Associates, Inc., Multioffice Commercial Banking: An Examina-
tion of the Issues and Alternatives in Minnesota (Washington, D.C., 1970); 
and Francis M. Boddy, "The Market Structure of Banking in Minnesota" 
(unpublished study prepared for the First Bank System, Inc., Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, 1976). 
®Based on an as yet unpublished study of bank prices and services by 
Stanley L. Graham, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis, Minnesota, 1977. 
9 A good example is the study by Golembe Associates. At the same time 
they looked at bank profitability, they tried to compare the prices at affili-
ates of Minnesota's MBHCs to those at all Minnesota banks. To do that 
they constructed three prices from banks' 1968 income statements and bal-
ance sheets: "return on loans," the total interest payments on loans di-
vided by the average outstanding stock of loans; "service charges," the 
total service charges divided by the average outstanding stock of demand 
deposits; and "interest on savings and time deposits," the total interest 
payments divided by the average stock of outstanding savings and time de-
posits. Using these measures, Golembe found virtually no difference be-
tween prices charged by Minnesota's MBHCs and all Minnesota banks. 
Again, see Carter H. Golembe Associates, Inc., Multioffice Commercial 
Banking: An Examination of the Issues and Alternatives in Minnesota 
(Washington, D.C., 1970). 
l^The survey is described more fully in Richard Stolz's "Local Banking 
Markets and the Relation Between Structure, Prices, and Nonprices in 
Rural Areas," Research Department Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1975. 
l*To help determine if the sample is representative of all rural banks in 
Minnesota, we compared the average profitability of affiliate and nonaffili-
ate sample banks using the ratio of net income to total assets. The differ-
ence matches that between all rural affiliates and nonaffiliates. 
4  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Fall 1977 MBHCs could be setting their own high prices 
without the evidence showing in the county data 
either. We would see no differences in prices and 
services between banks in counties with and without 
affiliates because the affiliates were setting the 
prices for all banks in the market—that is, the state. 
In one last attempt to detect noncompetitive be-
havior in Minnesota's banking industry, therefore, 
we use price and service data from a 1973 survey by 
the Federal Reserve Board
12to compare a sample of 
banks in Minneapolis-St. Paul to a sample of urban 
banks in states which prohibit both branching and 
holding companies. Presumably these states would 
be those most likely to have competitive banking in-
dustries. So if banking in Minnesota were not com-
petitive, prices would be higher and services less 
available here. 
But that is not true. Instead, these results, 
l^The survey is described more fully in Arnold A. Heggestad and John J. 
Mingo's "Prices, Nonprices, and Concentration in Commercial Banking," 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, February 1976, pp. 107-117. 
Table 2 
Prices and Services at Rural Banks 
Affiliated with Minnesota's Two Largest MBHCs 
and Other Rural Minnesota Banks 
(Based on 1975 survey) 
* Difference is significant at 10% level. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Table 3 
Prices and Services at Minnesota Rural Banks 
in Counties with Affiliates of the Two Largest MBHCs 
and in Other Counties 
(Based on 1975 survey) 
Rural 
Affiliates  Other  Rural Banks in Countie 
of Two  Rural  With  Without 
Large MBHCs  Banks  Affiliates  Affiliates 
PRICES (averages of prices reported)  PRICES (averages of prices reported) 
Interest Rates on:  Interest Rates on: 
Savings deposits  5.13%  4.88%  Savings deposits  4.88%  4.96% 
Certificates of deposit  Certificates of deposit 
90-day  5.58  5.48  90-day  5.50  5.50 
12-month  6.10  6.05  12-month  6.05  6.07 
4-year  7.27  7.28  4-year  7.26  7.32 
Loans  Loans 
Auto installment  10.34  10.61  Auto installment  10.39  10.89 • 
Farm machinery  9.85  9.04 •  Farm machinery  9.04  9.26 
Farm operating  7.86  8.04  Farm operating  7.99  8.08 
Service Charges for:  Service Charges for: 
Checking accounts (monthly)  $ .00  $ .50 *  Checking accounts (monthly)  $ .41  $ .50 
Nonsufficient funds checks (unit)  2.46  1.43 *  Nonsufficient funds checks (unit)  1.52  1.60 
Safety deposit boxes (min. annual)  5.46  3.89 •  Safety deposit boxes (min. annual)  4.02  4.16 
SERVICES  SERVICES 
Availability (% of banks offering)  Availability (% of banks offering) 
4-year certificates of deposit  100%  57% •  4-year certificates of deposit  63%  59% 
Overdraft credit  92  14 *  Overdraft credit  28  14 
Bank credit cards  23  9  Bank credit cards  8  14 
Automated 24-hour service  8  1  Automated 24-hour service  3  0 
Safety deposit boxes  100  100  Safety deposit boxes  100  100 
Hours Open Weekly (averages)  30.7  29.8  Hours Open Weekly (averages)  30.0  29.8 
Number of banks in survey  13  100  Number of banks in survey  71  42 
• Difference is significant at 10% level. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
5 shown in Table 4, are as mixed as those in the other 
two comparisons. On average, Minneapolis-St. Paul 
banks have charged some higher and some lower 
prices and generally have provided more services. 
Again, few of the differences are statistically signifi-
cant, and those that are put Minnesota on the side of 
consumers. 
Conclusion: A Competitive Banking Industry 
The best data available today suggest, therefore, 
that even though the two MBHCs hold a large share 
of the market, Minnesota's banking industry has 
been competitive: while on average affiliates of the 
two large MBHCs have been earning a higher rate 
of return than other banks, they have not been 
Table 4 
Prices and Services at Banks in 
Minneapolis-St. Paul and in Urban Areas 
of States Which Prohibit Branching and MBHCs
1 
(Based on 1973 survey) 
Urban Banks 
Minneapolis- in More 
St. Paul Restrictive 
Banks  States 
PRICES (averages of prices reported) 
Interest Rates on: 
Savings deposits  4.59%  4.52% 
Auto installment loans  9.49  9.36 
Service Charges for: 
Checking accounts (monthly)  $ .28  $1.02 * 
Nonsufficient funds checks (unit)  3.30  2.49 
Safety deposit boxes (min. annual)  5.60  5.18 
SERVICES 
Availability (% of banks offering) 
Overdraft credit  100%  36% • 
Automated 24-hour service  20  18 
Conventional mortgages  100  91 
Trust services  20  55 
Hours Open Weekly (averages)  40.6  34.9 • 
Number of banks in survey  5  22 
1 Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and West Virginia; "urban" 
areas are standard metropolitan statistical areas. 
* Difference is significant at 10% level. 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
charging higher prices or offering fewer services. In 
fact, they may actually be more efficient than other 
banks since they have been more profitable while 





Current restrictions in Minnesota's banking indus-
try are thus hard to justify. Without evidence of non-
competitive behavior, policy makers may have 
accidentally restricted the two large MBHCs just 
enough to keep them competitive, but that is highly 
unlikely. Instead, because of their concern about the 
potential for such behavior, policy makers have 
probably acted prematurely and too restrictively. 
Federal and state policy makers should there-
fore seriously consider moving toward a freer bank-
ing environment. They could allow more MBHC ac-
quisitions, some form of branch banking, and more 
innovative types of banking facilities. And to help 
prevent noncompetitive behavior, they could let 
banks from other states locate here. 
Minnesota's bankers and consumers would both 
benefit from the freer environment. Bankers would 
be better able to compete with other financial insti-
tutions, such as savings and loan associations, 
which have not shared these restrictions. Con-
sumers would be provided more convenient and in-
novative services; banks would be generally more 
responsive to consumer demands. And if affiliate 
banks really are more efficient than other banks, 
freer entry into Minnesota would turn their higher 
profit rates into lower prices for consumers. 
As long as the potential for noncompetitive be-
havior exists, of course, some government involve-
ment would be needed. The Federal Reserve System 
and other regulatory agencies should continue ex-
amining holding company acquisition requests and 
monitoring for noncompetitive practices. But gov-
ernment surveillance, competition from other types 
of financial firms, and competition from banks in 
other states should keep the potential from being 
realized. 
130f course, bank costs would have to be studied directly to determine this 
more conclusively. 
6  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Fall 1977 Policy makers have been concerned about noncompetitive behavior 
The potential for noncompetitive behavior in Min-
nesota's banking industry has developed despite an 
old restriction on bank expansion. Since 1923, indi-
vidual banks have not been allowed to branch, which 
many consider the easiest way for a bank to increase 
its share of the market. But banks have always been 
allowed to pool their equity in multibank holding 
companies (MBHCs). As a result, two MBHCs have 
been able to acquire a large share of Minnesota's 
banking market: First Bank System and Northwest 
Bancorporation together hold about half of Minneso-
ta's total bank deposits, while the next largest firm 
holds less than 3 percent. Affiliates of the two large 
firms also hold over 90 percent of all trust accounts 
in Minnesota and make close to 60 percent of all 
bank stock loans.
1 
Policy makers have been concerned about the 
effect these two companies may have on Minneso-
ta's banking industry. Because they hold such a 
large share of the market, the two may not need to 
compete. Instead, together they could make bigger 
profits by setting higher prices, offering fewer ser-
vices, and generally being less responsive to con-
sumer demands than other banks. 
This concern has led to policies restricting the 
activities of these two companies. 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, which has been responsible for approving 
holding company acquisitions since 1957, has been 
reluctant to let Minnesota's two large MBHCs ac-
quire more existing banks. These companies added 
95 percent of their affiliates before 1957 and have 
made relatively few applications for acquisitions 
since. Of course, the two simply may not have 
wanted to expand further. But that may have been 
partly because of the expressed Board concern 
about their size. For the Board has stated explicitly 
that concentration in Minnesota's banking industry 
is one of its major considerations in deciding which 
acquisitions to approve.
2 
Minnesota policy makers have also been limiting 
the activities of the state's two large MBHCs, 
mainly by refusing to allow any banks to expand in 
new ways. 
Because they believe branching is an easier way 
to expand than acquiring banks, state legislators 
have repeatedly defeated proposals to lift the 
branching ban. Such a proposal was not even 
seriously considered until the early 1970s, when a 
study recommended a more liberal law.
3 This year 
was the first time since 1923 that any branch 
banking legislation even got out of committee. The 
Senate actually passed it, but it died in a House 
committee. 
Electronic banking is still prohibited in Minneso-
ta too. Twice legislators sent former Governor 
Wendell Anderson a bill allowing banks to establish, 
within well-specified locations, remote electronic 
banking terminals similar to those already used by 
other financial firms. But he vetoed it twice saying it 
would let the two large MBHCs increase their large 
share of the market.
4 
This year Minnesota did loosen the restrictions 
on detached banking facilities. But the number each 
is allowed and where they can be placed are still 
severely limited.
5 
IPaul F. Jessup, "Minnesota's Exceptional Banking Structure: Research 
and Policy Perspectives," Research Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis, Minnesota, 1975, pp. 17, 28. 
2For example, set Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1968, p. 223, and 
January 1969, p. 63. 
^Carter H. Golembe Associates, Inc., Multiofftce Commercial Banking: 
An Examination of the Issues and Alternatives in Minnesota (Washington, 
D.C., 1970). 
4See Minneapolis Tribune, April 21, 1976, p. 4A. The legislature con-
sidered another electronic banking bill in 1977, but because of a technicality 
it did not pass both houses. 
^Subject to approval by the Minnesota Commissioner of Banks, any bank 
may establish not more than two detached facilities. They may be in the 
same municipality as the bank's principal office or within 5,000 feet or 
within 25 miles if in a municipality without a bank, with more than 10,000 
population, or with 10,000 or less by consent of all banks with a principal 
office located there. 
7 